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IDSTORY UNBECOMING,
BECOMING IDSTORY
Toni M. Massaro*
GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET. By
William N. Eskridge, Jr. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1999.
Pp. ix, 470. $45.
The last few decades have seen a torrent of legal commentary sup
porting gay equality and attacking the punishment, failure to protect,
and refusal to affirm gay conduct and identity. William Eskridge,1 a
prominent voice in this fin-de-siecle literature, now draws together
and expands on his previous work2 in Gaylaw:
Challenging the
Apartheid of the Closet. Though far more successful in shaping the
uses of the past than in showing the way to the future, the book in
structs even where it fails. It augurs a century that could well witness
the end of official discrimination against gay individuals, and the re
legation of "gaylaw" to American legal history.
Eskridge builds his chapters around three discrete definitions of
gaylaw:
•

•

"Gaylaw is the ongoing history of state rules relating to gender and
sexual non-conformity" (p. 1).
"Gaylaw is, also, reconceiving law from a more gay-friendly or gay
neutral perspective" (p. 2; emphasis added).

* Dean and Milton 0. Riepe Chair in Constitutional Law, The University of Arizona,
James E. Rogers College of Law. B.S. !CJ77, Northwestern; J.D. 1980, William & Mary . Ed. Many thanks to Barbara Allen Babcock, Bernard Harcourt, Genevieve Leavitt, and
Catherine O'Neill for invaluable critiques of this Review. Thanks also to Adam Michael
Becker and his colleagues on the Michigan Law Review for a smooth and professional edito
rial process.

1. Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
2. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. EsKRIDGE, JR & NAN D. HUNTER, SEXUALITY, GENDER, AND
THE LAW (1997); WILLIAM N. EsKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: FROM
SEXUAL LIBERTY TO CIVILIZED COMMITMENT (1996) [hereinafter EsKRIDGE, CASE FOR
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE]; William N. Eskridge, Jr., Challenging the Apartheid of the Closet:
Establishing Conditions for Lesbian and Gay Intimacy, Nomos, and Citizenship, 1961-1981,
25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 817 (1997); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gay/egal Narratives, 46 STAN. L.
REV. 607 (1994); William N. Eskridge, Jr., A Jurisprudence of "Coming Out": Religion,
Homosexuality, and Collisions of Liberty and Equality in American Public Law, 106 YALE
LJ. 2411 (1997); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Privacy Jurisprudence and the Apartheid of the
Closet, 1946-1961, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 703 (1997).
.
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"Gaylaw is, finally, derived from insights of the gay experience in
America and its theoretical sibling 'queer theory'" (p. 2; emphasis
added).

Under the first two definitions, he offers an excellent synthesis of the
historical backdrop to modern laws and a cogent analysis of legal doc
trine that addresses antigay policies. He makes a convincing case
against these policies as well, given their frequently unpredictable, un
toward consequences. Leaving behind the historical and pragmatic
arguments, however, Eskridge plunges into a theoretical thicket in
forging his third definition of gaylaw. He makes internally contradic
tory appeals to liberalism and to various postliberal models that un
dermine his doctrinal arguments, many of which depend heavily on
liberal premises.
That the book works so well in its historical and doctrinal seg
ments, but is less convincing in its final, theoretically thick segment,
may suggest a technique for future gay equality appeals. Legal advo
cates might do well to underscore, as Eskridge does repeatedly and
persuasively, how prohibitions of private, consensual sexual behavior
often produce paradoxical, counterproductive results. Government
regulation of private sexual behavior typically proves to be wasteful,
senseless, and destructive, no matter what outcome one prefers re
garding the behavior. Techniques that stress this practical insight may
yield far more progress in overturning antigay regulations than would
techniques that rely heavily on ornate political or legal theories about
government power to regulate sexual behavior. There is much to sup
port such a case against antigay laws in Eskridge's well-documented
and well-wrought historical exposition.
I.
Eskridge's opening segment canvasses a full century of legal treat
ment of sexual nonconformity in the United States. This engaging,
concise survey addresses government's historically variable attempts
to regulate sexual conduct and identity in multiple settings, including
the military, the family, social clubs and bars, and the streets. In each
venue, American law in the 1900s sought to suppress homosexuality
and gender transgression, with uneven, sometimes brutal, often inef
fective and paradoxical results. Over the century's course, law's con
structions of sexual deviance, and of the social perils of gender trans
gression, varied significantly.
Pre-1900, the law sought to police the "[w]omen and men who
transgressed increasingly hardened gender lines" by arresting indi
viduals whose public presentations disrupted conventional gender
rules (p. 13). After World War I, however, the legal focus shifted
away from this aesthetic preoccupation with public displays of trans
gressive gender behavior toward regulation of the "uncontrollable li-
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bido" of the homosexual (p. 14). The fear that animated the law was
that "children's budding sexuality" (p. 14) would be exploited or cor
rupted if homosexuality were to go unchecked or unpunished; the
prevalent legal image of the homosexual became that of sexual aggres
sor. During this period, "[t]he vampire lesbian and the predatory
child-molesting (male) homosexual replaced the mannish lesbian and
the female impersonator as the object of popular and legal concern
and, starting in the 1930s, hysteria" (p. 14).
World War II arrested the mounting "hysteria," as the inevitable
intensities and single-sex stratifications of military service relaxed cus
tomary social barriers, including those between same-sex colleagues.
Greater tolerance of male bonding, and a shift in the national gaze to
ward foreign conflicts rather than domestic, intersocial ones, made
American life - temporarily - less sexually fraught. Soon after the
War, however, the federal government reasserted gender barriers with
a vengeance, and launched an aggressive, anti-homosexual
"Kulturkampf' that Eskridge parallels to Nazi Germany's antihomo
sexual Kulturkampf of 1933-1946 (p. 14). Federal officials drummed
homosexuals out of public office, policed heavily known sites of gay
congregation, expanded and enforced laws that criminalized sexual
variation, and otherwise asked, told, and legally pursued gay men and
lesbians.
Yet even a Kulturkampf could not eliminate homosexuality. In
stead, it drove the behaviors underground, and in one of the many
ironies that mark official attempts to criminalize sexual behavior, it
"mold[ed] the context of the double life," and actually may have fos
tered the very behaviors it most strenuously sought to eradicate (p.
54). As Eskridge observes:

[B]y teaching thugs that they could have their way with fairies without
accountability, the law encouraged their sadism; by teaching fairies that
they were subhuman, the law inculcated in some of them a victim men
tality of masochism. For most other homosexuals, the law was less bru
tal, but it still augmented the excitement of same-sex intimacy by ren
dering it an intrinsically outlaw form of love. [p. 54]
The laws also inspired social organization and, eventually, resis
tance. Concerted action against the negative attitudes toward homo
sexuality, and against the most oppressive legal rules, emerged in the
1960s. In 1961, Franklin Kameny founded the Mattachine Society of
Washington,3 and, at the decade's close, the Stonewall riot erupted.4

3. "The Mattachine Society was a secret homophile organization founded in 1950 by
Harry Hay . " P. 75. The Mattachine Society of Washington was a Washington-based
chapter founded by Franklin Kameny in 1961. P. 97. This chapter was the first group to in
sist on legal equality for gay people. P. 98.
. . .

4. See MARTIN DUBERMAN, STONEWALL (1993) (describing the Stonewall riot and its
genesis).
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Gay rights leaders began to vocally and publicly reject the closeted
lives the laws had produced, on the ground that "the closet" was
"nothing more than an 'apartheid' . . . that intrinsically denies equal
citizenship and human dignity" (p. 15). Lawyers began to challenge
the aggressive police surveillance of gay meeting places and intrusions
into private zones, as their clients sought control over public spaces,
institutions, and communication methods crucial to gay association
and culture, for example, bars and restaurants, social and educational
organizations, and literature. They likewise demanded, with far less
success, equal treatment in employment, military service, immigration
status, and family rights (p. 15).
Building on Warren Court decisions that expanded concepts of
substantive due process (pp. 83-86), procedural due process (pp. 8692), freedom of association (pp. 93-95), freedom of speech and press
(pp. 95-96), and equal protection (p. 97), these litigants slowly earned
isolated, narrow victories that began to disentangle the law's confla
tion of gay status, speech, and conduct, as well as its unreflective pun
ishment of all three. As Eskridge later explains, early victories re
quired police and prosecutors to observe due process, and expanded
speech rights of activists. This helped pave the way to the current,
highly unstable doctrinal moment, in which official discrimination
based solely on one's status as gay or lesbian is constitutionally sus
pect,5 but criminalization of the underlying conduct that is most
strongly as�ociated with that status is arguably allowed.6
In setting forth this highly compressed synthesis of American law
from 1881-1981, Eskridge ably compiles and deploys numerous
accounts of these historical periods. He also offers fresh insight into
these histories by focusing on the considerable evidence of non
enforcement of laws regulating sexual conduct. As Eskridge notes, the
most repressive laws, passed during the most repressive eras, were
"honored mostly in the breach" (p. 82). Even during the straitlaced,
aggressively anti-homosexual 1950s, there were voices opposing these
measures, as proven by the notable example of the prestigious
American Law Institute's vote to decriminalize consensual sodomy in
a tentative draft of its Proposed Penal Code (p. 84); deregulatory and
nonenforcement impulses always coexisted alongside the strongest
regulatory and enforcement impulses.
This leads to a relevant and intriguing question that often is under
explored in historical accounts of antigay regulation: Who wasn't
prosecuted (and why)? Eskridge, significantly, addresses this puzzle
5. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (holding unconstitutional a state constitu
tional amendment that prohibited local governments from adopting regulations that barred
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation).
6. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding Georgia's sodomy statute
under substantive due process).
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and observes that race and class often influenced whose sexual non
conformance was (and still is) allowed to go unnoticed, and whose was
(and still is) not. He notes that law does not always prosecute those
who "flaunt" their sexuality; sometimes it does, and sometimes it does
not. Homosexual men are, Eskridge scoffs, "ridiculously easy to
catch" (pp. 65, 227). Yet "for every homosexual arrest there were tens
of thousands of unarrested homosexual acts" (p. 82; emphasis added).
Why?
Eskridge's simple and sensible answer is that full enforcement of
the anti-homosexual measures "would have been grossly expensive to
carry out properly, rested upon questionable and sometimes wacky
ideas, and - critically - included middle-class white men in [their]
dragnet" (pp. 82-83). Moreover, the enforcement of these laws often
had ironic, boomerang results: "[These laws] generated [their own]
opposition" by outing gay people, creating "shared identity" among
them, and eliciting anger and support among sympathetic nonhetero
sexuals" (p. 83). Indeed, anti-homosexual regulations and the under
lying animus that may explain them actually "create[d] a homosexual
rights movement" (p. 83; emphasis added), a claim that should give
aggressively antigay legislators pause.
II.
In his second segment, Eskridge turns to the contemporary
American legal scene, within which "gay people remain second-class
citizens" (p. 139). He analyzes the prohibition of same-sex marriage,
criminal statutes that still prohibit same-sex intimacy (especially
consensual sodomy), family law presumptions against child custody or
adoption rights for gay parents, the United States Military's exclusion
of openly gay service people, exclusion of sexual orientatiqn from the
forms of prohibited discrimination under federal, state, and local
antidiscrimination laws, and the various federal, state, and local
policies that prohibit teaching that homosexuality or same-sex
intimacy are acceptable - policies that Eskridge wryly terms "no
promo homo" provisions (pp. 139-40).
Eskridge frames this legal analysis with overarching observations
about law and social change. First, "evolution in public law is driven,
but not predetermined, by changes in society and culture generally,
and changing social and political power in particular" (p. 141) . Thus,
for example, the law's transition from criminalization of cross-dressing
to its forgoing of these forms of gender policing was not a matter of
doctrinal logic, but the result of changing views about, and wider
awareness of, gay lives, gay identities, and collective gay interests (p.
142).
Second, law plays a role in how we talk and think about sexual
variation (p. 143). It influences the governing rhetoric, and thus can
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shift the public and private focus away from pathologizing these varia
tions to assigning people rights based on these sexual variations.
Taken together, these insights suggest- sensibly enough- that any
future legal transitions, such as decriminalizing same-sex intimacy,
permitting gay people to serve in the military, or authorizing domestic
partnerships, will depend upon a cultural shift toward greater accep
tance of same-sex relationships and legal rhetoric that promotes such
acceptance.
In support of his more controversial assertion that law can effect
social transformation, Eskridge points to the Warren Court case law
on freedom of speech and constitutional criminal procedure, which
enabled gay people to "come out" with less fear that police and cen
sors would punish them (p. 147). These legal decisions influenced so
cial practices in positive ways that Eskridge believes belie more skep
tical accounts of courts' power to effect significant social change. 7
Correlatively, of course, law can have a significant negative impact on
gay lives. Cases like Bowers v. Hardwick8 actually may promote clos
eted behaviors by treating homosexuals as presumptive sodomites,
rather than as co-citizens (p. 146). That is, law acts as an independent
variable that affects gay people's lives (p. 145), for good or bad, not
withstanding the powerful role of factors external to law.
Eskridge urges that legal and social forces should tolerate sexual
variation and destigmatize homosexuality. Specifically, he argues that
"there is nothing about gender and sexual variation that justifies legal
discrimination and . . . the public culture ought to implement the prin
ciple of benign sexual variation by recognizing equal rights for gay
people" (p. 147). This would mean "state nondiscrimination as to gay
people, state neutrality as to these sexual variations, and state insis
tence on nondiscrimination in the marketplace" (p. 147). If the state
endorses these gay equality ends, then the stigma attached to sexual
orientation will slowly disappear (p. 147), an end that Eskridge de
sires.
***

Having set forth these descriptive claims about law's role in
shaping social practices, and a normative touchstone for critiquing this
role, Eskridge then turns to specific examples of antigay regulation.
He begins with Hardwick, and details the familiar critiques of the

7. The well-known contemporary work that casts doubt on the United Supreme Court's
influence on social change is GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS
BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 39-169 (1991). Rosenberg writes, "I have found little evi
dence that the judicial system ... produced much of the massive change in civil rights that
swept the United States in the 1960s." Id. at 157.
8. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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Court's logic, use of precedent, presentation of history, constitutional
interpretation methodology, and empirical analysis (pp. 149-66).
Eskridge concludes that Hardwick fails on all of these fronts, but
particularly violates doctrinal logic.
Hardwick fails as a matter of substantive privacy, because that
doctrine teaches that "the state has no business in the bedrooms of
consenting adults" even if what they are doing there is "disgusting" (p.
173). Sodomy laws also violate freedom of expression principles,
because they censor expressive conduct on a content-specific basis.9
Eskridge maintains that "sex is uniquely communicative" (p. 177) and
is clearly "no less - and sometimes a great deal more - commun
icative than erotic dancing, flag-burning, and wearing hate symbols"
(p. 178). Talking about and engaging in sex thus deserve First
Amendment scrutiny because both may promote the libertarian values
of autonomy and self-expression (pp. 178-79), as well as the dem
ocracy-enhancing values of citizen education, tolerance, and robust
public debate about public issues (pp. 180-82). Moreover, to the
extent that the First Amendment prohibits content- and viewpoint
based censorship, it promotes equality values, which Eskridge believes
point against allowing the State to selectively punish gay sexual ex
pression (pp. 182-83).
Anticipating reproaches that a great deal of conduct is similarly
expressive but not treated as protected speech; that freedom of ex
pression has never been unlimited for anyone in the military, on the
job, or in many other contexts crucial to gay rights; and that the pri
vacy of others may be infringed unduly if gay sexual expression is
deemed protected speech, Eskridge offers a brief reply. He concedes
that slippery slope objections are the "most intellectually serious"
ones, but says that the Supreme Court already has begun the slide to
ward "sexualizing" the First Amendment by acknowledging that erotic
dancing has expressive content.10 Why this alleged sexual slide should
continue, however, is more assumed by Eskridge than shown.
Eskridge acknowledges that courts typically defer to the military,
to employers, or to other government actors who manage controlled
environments. He adds, however, that the government's ability to
suppress such speech is restrained by the prohibition against viewpoint
discrimination, and by a more constitutionally pervasive obligation to

9. Here, Eskridge draws on his earlier work with a former colleague. See David Cole &
William N. Eskridge, Jr., From Hand Holding to Sodomy: First Amendment Protection of
Homosexual (Expressive) Conduct, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 319 {1994).
10. Pp. 176-77; see also City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 120 S. Ct. 1382 (2000) (concluding
that nudity is not inherently expressive, but nude dancing is expressive conduct); Barnes v.
Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 565-66 {1991) {plurality opinion) (suggesting that nude
dancing is expressive conduct, though it falls within the outer ambit of First Amendment
protection).
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act reasonably.11 Antigay policies fail to satisfy either requirement.
For example, Eskridge argues, the military "unit cohesion" defense of
its "don't ask, don't tell" policy, is neither reasonable nor evenly
enforced. It is also belied by the analogous American experience with
racially integrated troops. Unit cohesion was not undermined by
racial integration of soldiers, despite the strong fears to the contrary
that were advanced to resist this change.
Moreover, the First
Amendment's distaste for allowing a "heckler's veto" to silence a
speaker (p. 191) points against regulation of gay sexual expression.
The military or other government actors therefore should not permit
straight people's hostility to gay people to stifle the gay people's open
expression of their identities.
Eskridge scoffs at claims that open expression of sexual identity
would burden the privacy interests of straight people, even in the con
fines of the military barracks. Straight soldiers already risk whatever
loss of privacy may come from close living (including showering) with
closeted gay soldiers (p. 193); this loss of privacy is only veiled, not re
duced, by a policy that prohibits people from revealing their identities.
Eskridge then suggests that the real motive behind the military's
antigay policy is actually far more complex than any of the military's
commonly advanced but implausible explanations. It is that "homo
sexual attraction may be useful to the unit cohesion of same-sex units,
but only so long as the existence of a sexual feature to this bonding
can be plausibly denied" (p. 194; emphasis added). "Don't ask, don't
tell" helps the military preserve a delicate, unspoken sexual balance
among its members, which preserves the military's sexual identity, and
makes the close quarters and same-sex intimacies of service life less
fraught (p. 194).
To this last, provocative justification for suppressing open expres
sion of service people's sexual identity, Eskridge responds, in essence,
"get over it." Open expression of sexuality- whether among soldiers
or among other citizens - simply would not release a "Devlin-Scalia
parade of horribles" (p. 197), undermine troop morale, or erode public
morality. Nor would the First Amendment's central purpose as a
safeguard of political speech somehow be diluted by affording sexual
expression full free speech protection (pp. 197-99). The slippery slope
concern is overstated, says Eskridge, because other sexual conduct still
would receive First Amendment scrutiny, not, necessarily, insulation
from regulation. Moreover, deregulating sexual expression might
pave the way to "sexual discourse without hysteria," "yield more sex
ual peace and less sexual neurosis" (p. 195), and highlight wider
anomalies in free expression jurisprudence (p. 200). For example, the

11. Pp. 188-89. See, e.g., Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666,
677-78 (1998) (recognizing that even in a "nonpublic" forum, the government regulation of
speech must be reasonable in light of the purpose of the property).
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treatment of obscenity as "unprotected" speech might be revisited
(pp. 200-01). Again, government might still be permitted to regulate
obscenity and pornography (pp. 203-04), but only if the regulation
could withstand First Amendment strict scrutiny.12
Finally, Eskridge makes equal protection-based objections to
antigay measures that overlap with his privacy and freedom of expres
sion arguments, insofar as equal protection too requires that classifica
tions based on sexual orientation be rational. It also requires that the
classifications not rest solely on prejudicial stereotyping or resort to
rigid gender roles or animus. Eskridge states that "responses to sexual
or gender variation can usually be categorized as driven by either mo
rality (homosexuality is an abomination) or animus (I hate queers)"
(p. 210). Although the former may be a legitimate basis for regula
tion, per Hardwick, the latter is an improper basis for regulation, per
the Court's recent decision in Romer v. Evans.13
Romer held that Colorado's Amendment 2, which prohibited
adoption of any state law that banned discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation, violated the Equal Protection Clause.14 The Court
viewed the amendment as a "status-based enactment divorced from
any factual context from which [the Court] could discern a relation
ship to legitimate state interests,"15 and insisted that any antigay law
must rest on an assertion of something more than "popular animosity"
(p. 151). That is, the State must show that the disfavored class of peo
ple is committing harm, a harm that must be demonstrable; the regula
tion may not flow from mere animus or, as Eskridge puts it, "hysteri
cal and obsessional fears" of gay people (p. 225).
The State likewise cannot rely on justifications that conflict with
the Court's other case law, for example its prohibition of official en
forcement of fixed gender roles (p. 222). Rather, antigay regulations
now must bear some relation "to ability to perform or contribute to so
ciety" (p. 217; emphasis added). This is a quite different, more diffi
cult standard for the State to meet than the standard deployed in
Hardwick, where the Court upheld Georgia's criminalization of "ho
mosexual sodomy" on the basis of historical condemnation of homo-

12. According to Eskridge, sexualizing the First Amendment also might force the Court
to address a First Amendment "paradox, " under which courts are most vigilant in protecting
political expression in a public setting, while "most vigilant in protecting sexual expression in
a private setting." P. 200 (emphasis added). This paradox reflects, among other things, the
ways in which sex and intimacy are deemed intrinsically private in the United States. P. 201.
Eskridge maintains that protecting sexual expression in the public sphere would erode this
public/private dichotomy, which not only might free gay sexual expression for public expres
sion, but might protect more political speech in private settings.
13. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
14. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 635.
15. Id. at 635.
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sexuality.16 Eskridge thus concludes - correctly, in my view17 - that
Romer cannot be squared with the antigay logic of Hardwick (pp. 150,
151, 210-11).
Eskridge advocates that courts resolve this tension by overruling
or narrowly construing Hardwick, given the historical materials re
garding the futility and occasional brutality of antigay regulations. In
any event, he believes that the animus feature of antigay legislation
will often be more powerful than any public morality feature. More
over, the Court in Romer rejected Colorado's stated reasons for up
holding Amendment 2, which included conservation of scarce re
sources for enforcing civil rights, the interest of landlords and employ
ers in not associating with gay people, and the State's interest in
conveying disapproval of homosexuality (p. 209). These interests,
Eskridge notes, clearly were more weighty than "antihomosexual sen
timent held to be a rational basis for sodomy laws in Bowers v.
Hardwick" (p. 209). Eskridge believes that the rhetoric and reason of
Romer, not of Hardwick, eventually will prevail, as changes in society
and culture continue to erode an unblinking belief in the "unnatural"
harm of homosexuality. Legal doctrine will shift to prohibiting official
discrimination on the basis of homosexuality, because homosexuality
causes no demonstrable harm that satisfies the Romer test.
What Eskridge does not consider is that the Romer shift in judicial
rhetoric - which demands a showing of reasons for antigay policies could have adverse consequences. To approve an antigay measure,
post-Romer, courts must declare the measure to be "rational." This
could lend a different, more worrisome rhetorical force to official in
tolerance of, or animosity toward, gay people (it may be harsher to
call an antigay measure "rational" than to simply uphold it on the
ground that it has "ancient roots," as the Court did in
Hardwick) .18 Eskridge nevertheless appeals to judicial reason, by as
serting that
laws focusing on homosexuality or gay people have usually been moti
vated by hysterical, obsessional, or narcissistic and not public-regarding,
fact-based reasoning; have repeatedly proven to be socially unproductive
laws that either wreak policy havoc or waste state resources or (if unen
forced) simply serve as symbolic spite measures; and focus on a class of
people subject to unjustified social scorn and violence, whose unfair

16. The Court in Hardwick invoked the "ancient roots" of proscriptions on homosexuals
as a basis for its refusal to invalidate the Georgia sodomy law. See 478 U.S. at 192. As the
Court further stated, " [t]he law ... is constantly based on notions of morality, and if all laws
representing essentially moral choices are to be invalidated under the Due Process Clause,
the courts will be very busy indeed." Id. at 196.
17. See Toni M. Massaro, Gay Rights, Thick and Thin, 49 STAN. L. REV. 45, 88 (1996).
18. See id. at 86-87, 93-94, 102-09 (discussing several potential problems with a rational
basis strategy).
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plight has typically been worsened by state brutalization and stigma. [p.
217]
The passage implicitly assumes that the enumerated flaws of antigay
regulation will be recognized as such by judges, and that judicial rul
ings against these laws will produce positive social change for gay peo
ple.
Eskridge bolsters this rational basis argument against antigay
measures with arguments that discrimination against gays and lesbians
must be supported by "exceedingly persuasive justification[s],"19 be
cause it is a form of gender discrimination. He then applies these mul
tiple principles to the denial of marriage licenses to same-sex couples,
and concludes that these denials are unconstitutional, per the equal
protection logic of Loving v. Virginia.20 The Court in Loving prohib
ited states from denying marriage licenses to interracial couples (p.
219). In both the interracial and the same-sex marriage examples,
similarly situated actors arguably are treated "alike" (i.e., no one can
marry outside of his or her race; no one can marry a person of the
same sex). Marriage is not - the argument continues - inherently
monoracial, inherently procreative, or inherently heterosexual. The
prohibitions therefore are best explained by other, constitutionally il
legitimate motives - i.e., to preserve white supremacy, in the case of
antimiscegenation laws, and to preserve traditional gender roles and
heterosexuality supremacy, in the case of laws that restrict marriage li
censes to male/female partners.21
Before concluding his cumulatively powerful arguments against
antigay laws, however, Eskridge equivocates. If allowing same-sex
marriage or openly gay people to serve in the military is too politically
unpopular, he cautions, then the Court might, and perhaps should,
simply dodge these issues, whether by denying certiorari or by main
taining, a la Hardwick, that the political process should determine
these prohibitions' fate. He then inserts still another caveat: this last
move too would expend judicial political capital. (If, for example, the
Court upholds "don't ask, don't tell," on the ground that the military
alone should decide issues of troop cohesion and effectiveness, then
the Court must justify that conclusion; "[a]n analytically or factually
flawed opinion would open the Court to harsh criticism" (p. 229);
19. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 524 (1996) (holding that equal protection
precluded Virginia from reserving exclusively to men the unique educational opportunities
of Virginia Military Institute) (quoting Mississippi Univ. Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724
(1982) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
20. 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (striking down Virginia's miscegenation laws on equal protection
and substantive due process grounds).
21. Pp. 220-28. There is a rich subliterature within contemporary work on gay rights
that takes up the controversial subject of same-sex marriage. For an elaboration of
Eskridge's views and the applicable constitutional arguments, see EsKRIDGE, CASE FOR
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE, supra note 2.
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similar to the resounding criticism it received for Hardwick.) The saf
est course among these perilous ones thus may be to engage in
Bickelian "not doing,"22 and allow experimentation among the states,
at least in areas like same-sex marriage, where state constitutional is
sues dominate.23
III.
In his final, most troubling segment, Eskridge moves beyond his
torical and contemporary legal frames to argue that gay experiences
and queer theory might, or should, shape not only future gender law,
but future general jurisprudence. He plunges into a morass of con
flicting theories and perspectives, including (but not limited to) liber22. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEASf DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURTATTHEBAROFPOLITICS 169 (1962) (describing the Court's "techniques of 'not do
ing,' devices for disposing of a case while avoiding judgment on the constitutional issue it
raises").
23. These state-level developments are well under way, as the Vermont Supreme Court
held in December of 1999, in Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999). The court held that the
common benefits clause of the Vermont Constitution requires that the Vermont legislature
confer the same benefits upon same-sex couples as it grants to married couples, on the
ground that "legal protection and security for their avowed commitment to an intimate and
lasting human relationship is simply, when all is said and done, a recognition of our common
humanity." 744 A.2d at 889. This judicial act of will and grace is counterpoised, of course,
by legislative measures in other states that expressly prohibit same-sex marriage; in Vermont
itself, the legislative response was not to sanction gay marriage, but to move toward domes
tic partnerships that confer the same benefits on same-sex couples as are conferred upon
married couples.

In any event, this "safest course" for, the United States Supreme Court is no longer
available in some areas, such as in the Title VII context, where the Court already has
addressed whether same-sex harassment is an actionable form of sex discrimination. See
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998) (holding same-sex harassment
is actionable if similar harassment of a different sex victim would not have been tolerated by
the employer). Unless the Court later concludes that discrimination "on the basis of sex"
means something quite different under Title VII than it does under the Fourteenth
Amendment, then these Title VII developments are very likely to influence constitutional
rights as well as statutory ones. To frame two different definitions of what constitutes dis
crimination "on the basis of sex" would be a quite different distinction between statutory
and constitutional rights than it was for the Court to frame two different standards for
establishing a Fourteenth Amendment violation and a Title VII violation. See Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (holding that the racially disparate impact of a facially race
neutral measure does not, absent evidence of intent to discriminate, trigger strict scrutiny,
and contrasting this constitutional standard with the stricter standards of Title VII, which do
not require a showing of intent).
Still another area where the Court has chosen to act, rather than to wait and see, in
volves the fuzzy zone between public antidiscrimination laws and private associational and
expressive freedom. See, e.g., Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual, Inc., 515
U.S. 557 (1995) (holding that public accommodations law could not be applied to compel
private group to include gay and lesbian group in St. Patrick's Day parade). The Court's
pending case reviewing the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision that the Boy Scouts can
not exclude gay youths and adults from positions of leadership also will address this tension,
and could further restrict government's power to prohibit antigay private conduct. See Boy
Scouts of America v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 865 (2000), granting cert. to 734 A.2d 1196 (N.J. 1999).
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alism, pragmatism, progressive postliberalism, and feminism - all
covered over with a mossy romanticism.
I will first summarize the arguments of this third segment, before
turning to why I find the segment baffling on many levels. According
to Eskridge, the guide to the future is "queer theory," which by his ac
count "starts with the assumption that gender, sexuality, and perhaps
even sex are social constructions and not natural givens" (p. 444 n.1).
Obviously, this insight destabilizes the natural-law assumptions behind
the legal regulation of sex, and requires a reconsideration not only of
laws against homosexuality, but of consensual sadomasochism,
intergenerational sex, incest, and more. Even these forms of sexual
expression, which are unlikely to obtain legal protection, would re
ceive a new analysis - one mindful of the tendency of sexual regula
tions to "yield a costly dynamic and . . . contribute to the ongoing tra
dition of sex negativity in America" (p. 258).
This tradition of sex negativity springs in part, Eskridge suggests,
from the "hysterical," "obsessional," and "narcissistic" impulses that
undergird the legal and social suppression of sexual nonconformity
(pp. 224-25, 298). A more sensible and humane legal regime would
grant "full equality" to gay people (p. 320), and would embrace "be
nign sexual variation" just as it has embraced the idea of "benign re
ligious variation" (p. 293). The State should restrain itself "from en
gaging in public anti-religious or antigay censorship or discrimination"
and should "prohibit private censorship or discrimination on the basis
of religion or sexual orientation" (p. 302; emphasis added).
The liberalism that Eskridge endorses elsewhere - with its stress
on the state's negative obligations, i.e., noninterference with basic life
decisions, privacy, freedom of expression, and procedural due process
- seems out of place in this brave new world. Yet Eskridge betrays
his ambivalence about abandoning altogether a theory that may fur
ther gay equality aims. Indeed, he observes that if the basic assump
tion of queer theory is wrong, and sexual identity is innate, then "the
liberal arguments retain almost full strength[, because then] compul
sory heterosexuality cruelly stigmatizes and penalizes gay people for
traits they cannot control, and hurts nongay people who enter into un
fulfilling relationships with closeted gays" (p. 284; emphasis added).
There is an awkward embrace at this point - if liberalism can do the
work of advancing gay equality, then it may be the weapon of choice.
But Eskridge then recites the practical limitations of a liberal ap
proach to sexual variation. First is that American law does not pursue
liberalism principles to their logical limits, despite its ostensible com
mitment to liberalism (p. 245). If it did, certain consensual acts that
now are criminalized would not be, including consensual sodomy be
tween adult, same-sex partners, but also - perhaps - consensual for
nication, incest, and adultery, among others (p. 247). Eskridge's ex
planation for this lapse is that "consensual choice is not, even in our
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liberal society, separable from recognized statuses" (p. 250). Em
ployment laws recognize, for example, that higher-status partners may
coerce lower-status partners to consent to sex, and criminal laws seek
to prevent other potentially nonconsensual sex, such as sex with a mi
nor (pp. 250-51). The law also reflects the status of traditional mar
riage and heterosexuality by preventing same-sex adult partners from
marrying or from engaging in sexual relations.
Eskridge's next turn is the most destabilizing. Liberalism not only
is imperfectly achieved in American law, but it is also an inherently
flawed model for civil rights. The right to be "let alone"24 by the State
may allow and even promote the ways in which private institutions of
ten can, and do, punish nonconformity. Moreover, "[h]uman beings
are not autonomous bundles of exogenously defined preferences
seeking satisfaction.... [but] are social beings struggling to make con
nections with one another" (p.283). In family contexts, this limitation
of liberal theory is particularly striking.
Eskridge concludes that liberalism's notion that a noninterven
tionist state is the best means of maximizing gay autonomy must be
qualified: some legal interventions are necessary to prevent private
abuses of gays. Again, the State must restrain itself from interfering
with sexual variation, and must prevent private actors from interfering
with sexual variation. In doing both, it should invoke as a substantive
backstop the "relational" value of protecting same-sex relationships,
i.e., these relationships benefit the adult couples and their children
(pp. 285-88). It also should also focus on feminist discourse that em
phasizes "sexual mutuality" (p. 268) as the normative measure of sex
worthy of legal or social approval, which he says - unfortunately and
risibly in my view - has "a procedural component."25 These proce
dural steps - a species of notice and opportunity to be heard - "en
tail[] a conversation about what one enjoys and what one does not
enjoy, and ... stopping when ... one says 'stop' or a safe word" (p.
269).
Eskridge tries to soften the clash between his postliberal, norma
tive claims, and his liberal, noninterventionist arguments by insisting
on their shared gaylaw ends:
[A]rguments for gay families ... rest on something more profound than
choice .... [G]ay families are good for gay people and good for Amer24. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 494 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring)
(quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478) (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
25. P. 269. I appreciate the important function of "safe words" in sexual encounters,
particularly in the shadowy and potentially dangerous realm of sadomasochistic encounters
or sex between relative strangers. Yet this description of sex as having a "procedural com
ponent" made me chuckle. Procedural due process concepts and terminology play an impor
tant role in many venues, but the bedroom is not obviously among them. Perhaps my resis
tance to proceduralizing sex is itself based on romanticism, . not reason, but I resist
nonetheless.
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ica because they provide fora in which people form mutual commitment
and children are reared. Any effort by the state to discourage gay fami
lies is perverse because it discourages commitment and harms children."
[p. 278; emphasis added]
The policies are also wrong because they invade privacy and individ
ual autonomy.
Note well the profound shift - "gay" is not just a sexual variation
that a liberal state should tolerate and, as necessary, protect from
those who are "disgusted" by it; rather, gay is good. Moreover,
Eskridge elaborates, "sex is good and normal when the participants
welcome it, when the sex is truly a joint enterprise meeting the needs of
the partners" (p. 170; emphasis added).
He then weaves away from this normative defense of gay sexual
equality, back to his pragmatic argument for deregulating sexual varia
tion. Criminal laws against gay sexual conduct are a "wast[e] [of]
valuable human resources that could be expended in producing and
problem-solving" (p. 308). Liberals, progressive postliberals, and
pragmatists therefore all should agree to this much - that antigay
regulations are "bad policy."
Eskridge doesn't forget the feminists. Much antigay animus, he
argues, springs from an insistence on traditional gender stereotypes.
Consequently, legalization of same-sex marriage, overruling of Hard
wick, allowing openly gay service people into the military, preventing
sexual orientation discrimination in the workplace, awarding gay par
ents child custody and adoption rights, and possibly allowing "poly
parenting" and other unconventional family arrangements also would
promote the social and legal interests of women. That is, to defy the
traditional gender stereotypes that constrain gay and lesbian lives
would, perforce, erode the traditional gender stereotypes that con
strain many female lives, insofar as they too are premised on negative
and mistaken assumptions about the role of gender in shaping human
abilities, roles, and natures.
***

Eskridge closes this theoretically dense segment with a proposed
methodology for recognizing the rights of gays and lesbians while still
respecting the interests of heterosexuals. His model comes from the
clash at Georgetown University when gay and lesbian student groups
sought recognition and benefits equal to other student groups.26 In
voking its Jesuit roots, Georgetown refused. The students sued under
the District of Columbia's Human Rights Act forbidding the denial of
educational facilities based on sexual orientation.27 No court could
26. See Gay Rights Coalition v. Georgetown Univ., 536 A.2d 1 (D.C. 1987) (en bane).
27. Seep. 303; Gay Rights Coalition, 536 A.2d at 4.
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resolve this conflict without denying what Eskridge calls the "nomic"
community interests of one of these litigants. To honor Georgetown's
sense of its Jesuit origin and identity would be to deny the student
groups equal participation in the life of the University. To honor the
students' participation interests would be to violate Georgetown's
interest in shaping its religious identity. Either way, the court would
be forced to choose between "nomic" communities. A similarly dif
ficult choice must be made between nomic communities when a
Presbyterian landlord refuses to rent an apartment to an unmarried
couple, or when the Hibernian Order bans openly gay participants
from its annual St. Patrick's Day parade.28 In each scenario, disrespect
of some group's values will result regardless of the outcome.
Eskridge argues that in such intractable situations, judges should
try to accommodate the colliding perspectives, rather than choose one
side as the all-out winner and deem the other side the loser (p. 310).
The opponents in the controversy likewise should try to accommodate
each other, by respecting "the central need of the other, unless that
accommodation would sacrifice that side's central need . . . . [E]ach
side should remain open to information about the other and to the
common interests that are still shared" (pp. 311-12), with as much re
spect for others' points of views as their differing commitments and
self-respect may allow. An apt illustration of this accommodationist
approach, says Eskridge, was the court's decision in the Georgetown
case "to require Georgetown to provide the student groups with equal
access and benefits but not to require it to grant official recognition to
the groups" (p. 303). Eskridge states that the strength of the opinion
was that it "value[d] the claims of both nomoi" (p. 303). He does not
explain, however, how to weigh each set of nomic values, or how to re
solve cases in which any compromise among group interests may be
experienced not as Solomonic, but as an intolerable loss to all groups
concerned. The depth and intensity of nomic differences may not al
ways permit accommodation or allow the parties to see their common
interests. The method also presupposes a judge who can identify and
will value the central needs of both nomoi. Such emphatic skills are
wonderful judicial (and human) qualities, but are unevenly distributed
among us. Nevertheless, Eskridge's accommodationist model is a very
appealing one for groups that seek recognition and tolerance as a first
step toward acceptance.

28. See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 556 (holding that applying public acco=odations law to re
quire defendants to include gay and lesbian group in St. Patrick's Day parade violated First
Amendment rights of parade organizers).
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N.

Eskridge makes several assertions in his final segment that are
hard to square with some of the insights of the preceding segments.
First is the assertion of the "good" in what Eskridge describes, often in
the singular, as "gay experience" (pp. 244, 259, 269, 323). Second is
the celebration of nomic pluralism and apparent embrace of postlib
eral theory. Third is his psychopathological account of antigay am
mus. Let me take these in order.
Eskridge's historical and legal discussions suggest that a central
explanation for law's irrational treatment of sexual variation is that
legislators and judges, along with the rest of us, persistently fail to
perceive (let alone tolerate, accept, or celebrate) the full range and
complexities of individual sexual desires. This is a profound point that
is best apprehended if one stands back and observes how woodenly
the law has responded to sexual complexities over time. History
shows that law has resorted to blunt regulatory measures that attempt
to construct, cabin, and eradicate particular categories of sexual var
iation. Law also has ascribed meanings to these variations that are
one-dimensional and reductive, and that are invariably negative. If
Eskridge's theory about law's rhetorical force holds true, then legal
history has helped to create what people, including gay men and
women, think "gay" means. This makes any positive account of "gay
experience" problematic, because these experiences are potentially
tainted by the stunted and negative legal constructions.
Moreover, Eskridge's use of the terms "gaylaw" and "gay experi
ence" in the third segment departs significantly and confusingly from
his use of these terms in the first two segments. In his historical and
doctrinal segments, "gaylaw" refers to the law's definition and pun
ishment of a changing assortment of sexual outlaws. Here we meet
the "gay" person as gender bender, the "ridiculously easy to catch"
violator of sodomy laws, a member of a "homophile group," any fe
male softball team member, any "gay bar" patron, a female inmate
who "weds" her partner in a mock prison rite, and an apparently "de
lighted" minor male engaged in sodomy with an older man (p. 88).
The "gay" person is also the member of a same-sex couple denied a
marriage license, the soldier booted out because of doubt about his or
her heterosexuality, a "sodomite," a guidance counselor who says she
is bisexual,29 and a man holding hands with another man in the park.
"Gaylaw" refers both to the regulations of these "gay" people and
to the (mostly unsuccessful) judicial challenges of the regulations.
29. See Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 730 F.2d 444 (6th Cir. 1984) {holding
that a public high school guidance counselor's statement regarding her sexual preference was
not made as a citizen speaking out on a public matter, and that her resulting discharge was
unconstitutional).
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"Gay experience," one must assume, was distorted and cramped by
these harsh legal constructions of "gay," or else the closet metaphor
would not have such gloomy resonance. In any event, "gaylaw" his
torically has not denoted a fixed, unitary status or conduct, and it cer
tainly has not been affirming of gay identity.
Eskridge seems to repress this history and its dark connotations
when he invokes the term "gaylaw" to denote law as it might be trans
formed by "gay experience" and infuses this experience with entirely
positive attributes. He states that gay experience "decouple[s] [sex]
from procreation" and links it instead "to its social function of deep
ening human relationships" (p. 240). "Gay families" are "families of
choice" and "gaylaw views sex as good and not shameful, public as
well as private" (p. 240). "Gaylaw" further denotes law that takes as a
normative baseline the experiences of gay people, who are all engaged
in relationships founded on principles of mutuality, respect, and love.
Again, "gay" is not just a sexual variation that a liberal state should
tolerate and, as necessary, protect from those who are "disgusted" by
it; rather, gay is good. Yet this optimistic and monolithic description
of contemporary gay experience cannot be right, unless the past hos
tility documented by Eskridge has had no negative psychosocial con
sequences for these relationships, or distorting effects on their mean
ings, which Eskridge forcefully denies.
Romanticizing gay relationships also conflicts with Eskridge's ear
lier plea that we take the "hysterical" out of legal regulation by per
mitting even "disgusting" private sexual behaviors (p. 173) and "re
volting" expression (p. 198). To replace sexual "hysteria" with
approval of gay sexual expression and relationships, on the assump
tion (or condition) that these relationships are (or must be) founded
on mutuality, respect, and love, is to reject implicitly the liberal neu
trality that Eskridge urges in his free speech argument.
This leads to another troubling aspect of the third segment:
Eskridge's wide angle, all-theories-in-a-storm approach seriously un
dermines the book's overall conceptual coherence. For example, his
embrace of a "relational" approach to family law issues, and of an
accommodationist approach to clashes between "classic" communities
is hard to reconcile with his appeal for agnosticism toward outre, indi
vidual sexual behaviors, or with a strong liberal assignment of indi
vidual rights. Postliberal skepticism about the distinction between
omissions and commissions, and about the possibility of state
"neutrality," greatly weakens arguments against state regulation of
sexual expression that "disgusts" others.
For example, if courts were to pitch traditional, liberal definitions
of what constitutes a regulable, demonstrable harm, state power, to
prevent aesthetic, social, and other costs of disruptive sexual expres
sion, could expand. States more easily could assert that sexually ex
pressive materials and behaviors, such as pornography, sex shops, or
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cruising, are visual signals that may encourage lawbreaking and other
harmful secondary effects, as some contemporary accounts claim.30
Courts that embraced a postliberal approach to these alleged potential
harms of sexual expression likely would weigh these potential harms
more heavily in their free speech calculus. A postliberal construction
of harm thus might produce a very ironic result: revival of the pre1900 and early 1900s approach to policing gender deviance (among
other signals of social "disorder") through stricter anti-loitering, cen
sorship, zoning, and other laws - laws that Eskridge earlier describes
as "wacky."31
The social constructionist insights that Eskridge seems to endorse
in the third segment thus pose serious structural problems for the tra
ditional First Amendment principles he touts in the second segment.
Indeed, a "social constructionist" approach to free speech doctrine
could lead one to conclude that obscenity law, and the much maligned
"secondary effects" subcategories within First Amendment case law,
are the more sensible and appropriate responses to the societal degra
dation and other harms of sexual expression. That is, case law that
allows communities to regulate, zone, and criminalize some sexual ex
pression should inform the rest of First Amendment doctrine (and
"gaylaw"), not the other way around, as Eskridge would have it.
Eskridge might have responded to these structural concerns by
demonstrating how postliberal theory, too, would support the gay sex
ual expression model proposed in the second segment. Instead, he
rests his argument for treating sexual conduct as worthy of free speech

30. This literature is based on the "broken windows" theory of crime first asserted by
James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling, which assumes that visible "disorder" breeds crime,
and that measures that reassert visual order, such as fixing broken windows and sweeping
street corners of persons who appear to be gang members, will reduce crime. See James Q.
Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1982, at 29.
31. P. 83. Indeed, the new "order maintenance policing" style of law enforcement
advocates exactly these sorts of measures to "clean up" neighborhoods. See Bernard E.
Harcourt, Reflecting on the Subject: A Critique of the Social Influence Conception of
Deterrence, The Broken Windows Theory, and Order-Maintenance Policing New York Style,
97 MICH. L. REV. 291 (1998) (discussing and critiquing order-maintenance policing and the
"broken windows" thesis); Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence,
83 VA. L. REV. 349, 357 (1997) (discussing the importance of reducing the visible signs of
criminal activity, because they reduce the stigma of engaging in crime and thereby promote
criminal activity).
For a recent, very insightful analysis of the shift in the rhetoric of "harm" that occurs
within the new policing measures, see Bernard E. Harcourt, The Collapse ofthe Harm Prin
ciple, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 109 (1999). Harcourt's exposition suggests that liber
alism too might be invoked in defense of the new policing measures, given the conservative
deployment of liberal harm principles. See id. at 161-67. That is, strict anti-loitering laws can
be defended not as "enforcement of morality" measures, but as measures that prevent
"harm to others" in a liberal sense. This is because, Harcourt argues, the harm principle "is
no longer an effective response to conservative proposals to regulate. To the contrary . . .
harm has become the principal argument for state intervention." Id. at 146.
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protection exclusively on liberal grounds, with no explanation of how
that argument survives the critique of liberalism in the third segment.
Let me be clear: I do not object to Eskridge's use of liberalism
principles as a matter of doctrinal analysis and proposed litigation
strategy. Constitutional doctrine itself touts liberal assumptions however inconsistently - that do point toward gay equality ends.
Forcing judicial fidelity to this doctrine is supremely f air and logical.
What I found so confusing was the selective invocation of liberalism
within an analysis of government regulation of sexual variations that
(1) argues against a liberal-traditionalist principle of choice; (2) in
vokes a normative principle of mutuality as the touchstone of worthy
sexual relations (p. 269); and (3) validates a status-based defense of
traditional male-female marriage by observing that "underlying cul
tural anxieties . . . cannot be ignored" (p. 278). The strong liberal ar
gument for a sexualized First Amendment makes little sense if one
also insists that the liberal version of the self is "too limited," insofar
as it fails to account for the "relational self' (p. 284).
Moreover, if we chuck out liberalism's excessive, characteristic re
spect for individualism, then it becomes harder to justify judicial inter
ference with the church's or the family's contribution to closeted sexu
ality (p. 313). Yet to protect and celebrate the value of such "classic"
nomic communities, as Eskridge does, could afford the most powerful
among these tremendous influence over gay equality's progress and
over the fate of the gay, often closeted, members of these communi
ties.
Eskridge nevertheless argues against intervention into these pri
vate associations, despite their antigay commitments, in order to re
spect the relational value of "classic" nomoi. He never clearly defines
a "classic" nomoi (p. 313), however, or explains why "nonclassic" ones
should not receive the same respect (p. 179). "Nonclassic," even
deeply offensive, nomic communities presumably would promote the
experimentalism and pluralism functions of the First Amendment that
Eskridge celebrates (pp. 179-80): Likewise confusing is his caveat that
respect for subcultural nonioi should occur only "so long as their
members have the option of separating" (p. 313; emphasis added).
This is a potentially quite significant restriction of subcultural auton
omy and of Eskridge's version of postliberal theory, insofar as separa
tion often is not a viable option for members of many "classic" relig
ious nomoi. Rather, one who "separates" may be viewed as an
outcast, a heretic, or damned, not as a respected member of a coequal,
nomic tribe. Postliberal theories that advocate respectful, full defer
ence to group identity and autonomy likely would not accept a broadly
stated "right to separate" restriction on group autonomy. It is tradi
tional liberal theory, most notably, that insists on the individual's right
to "separate" (though even liberalism has difficulty with "separation"
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when it includes secession into illiberal, intolerant associations, com
munities, or practices32).
This particular thicket is deadeningly familiar: illiberal philoso
phies potentially undermine any public principle of tolerance of sexual
variation, and thus of gay equality, whereas liberal philosophies poten
tially undermine any private value of physical, economic, and psycho
logical security for gay people. We already know that liberalism has
these values and inherent limitations. By ostensibly shifting to
postliberal theory, then adding a liberal caveat, Eskridge doesn't trav
erse this bog; he merely sinks deeper.
Eskridge had several means of portage here, none of them perfect.
He might have stuck to a liberalism plank, until it ran out, and at that
point simply observed that no theory is complete - there are trap
doors everywhere
but that liberalism carries us as far toward gay
equality ends as the alternatives. Or, he might have simply rejected
the liberalism plank altogether. Instead, Eskridge rests on a liberalism
plank in some places, while extending several new planks in others,
without fully explaining how (or whether) courts might reconcile
them.
A fourth, likely better, option might have been to avoid this politi
cal theory morass altogether, given that it is ultimately unnecessary in
achieving the legal outcomes that most engage him
for example,
decriminalizing sodomy; providing legal protection to same-sex rela
tionships; respecting custody rights of gay and lesbian parents; and al
lowing openly gay and lesbian military personnel to serve. Liberalism
plausibly (but not perfectly) supports each of these outcomes (so
might other theories, by the way33). Introducing multiple and com
peting political theories detracts from an otherwise compelling, excel
lent chronicle of the noncontroversial harms that antigay laws cause,
and blunts the more meaningful, sharper point that these noncontro
versial harms are not worth incurring or inflicting.
A final difficulty I had with Eskridge's analysis was his treatment
of antigay animus. Drawing on the work of Elisabeth Young-Bruehl,34
Eskridge maintains that much antigay animus resembles racial preju
dice in its hysterical qualities, resembles anti-Semitism in its obses
sional qualities, and resembles sexism in its narcissistic qualities, which
makes homophobia "an all-purpose prejudice" (p. 211). He analo-

-

32. See ALLEN BUCHANAN, SECESSION: THE MORALITY OF POLITICAL DIVORCE
FROM FORT SUMTER TO LITHUANIA AND QUEBEC {1991); Allen Buchanan, Toward a The
ory of Secession, 101 ETHICS 322 {1991); Michael Walzer, Liberalism and the Art ofSepara
tion, 12 POL. THEORY 315 {1984).
33. See Massaro, supra note 17, at 92-102 {describing how the economic utilitarianism
approach of Richard Posner, the natural law approach of John Finnis, and the social con
structionist approach of Janet Halley may all point toward most of the gay equality ends that
Eskridge addresses).
34. ELISABETH YOUNG-BRUEHL, THE ANATOMY OF PREJUDICES {1996).
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gizes American antigay regulations with Nazism (pp. 80-82) - "[T]he
Nazi goal was Holocaust, genocide, while the American goal was
Kulturkampf, erasure" (p. 82) - and argues that the animating psy
chological impulses of such anti-homosexual urges include "hysterical
demonization of gay people as dirty sexualized subhuman, obsessional
fears of gay people as conspiratorial and sexually predatory, and nar
cissistic desires to reinforce stable heterosexual identity and gender
roles by bashing gay people" (p. 209). That is, antigay prejudice often
is the product of a psychologically disturbed and deeply insecure mind,
not just an ignorant or selectively indifferent one.
While some versions of antigay animus likely do merit treatment as
a psychiatric disorder, it is doubtful that all do. Just as misogyny likely
is less common than is treatment of women in unreflective, reductive
ways that translate into negative social and economic consequences,
"homogyny" likely is less common than is treatment of all people ac
cording to heterosexual norms that translate into quite harmful, but
often unintended, social and economic consequences for gay people.
Moreover, human resistance to, and sometimes even violence in the
face of, ambiguity are well known. Although clinical hysteria, obses
sion, or narcissism may figure in some of our resistance to sexual am
biguity and to deviation from conventional gender norms, a more
complete and complicated picture would focus on humans' general
discomfort with fuzziness.35 Drawing some lines - including ones be
tween and among people - is probably inescapable, and may even be
psychologically healthy, insofar as separation between oneself and
others is necessary to the development of a mature, nonnarcissistic
se1f.36
Normalizing the bases of some human prejudices, however, hardly
clears the path to gay equality. On the contrary, it throws up more
roadblocks than it eliminates. It forces us to see - alas - that many
of the most relevant dividing lines here are ones that shape basic social
patterns, institutions, and norms. They include the lines between male
and female, between permission and taboo, between family and non
family, between domesticated and wild, between law and outlaw, and
between saved and damned.37 Coloring outside of any of these lines

35. See, e.g., EVIATAR ZERUBAVEL, THE FINE LINE: MAKING DISTINCTIONS
EVERYDAY LIFE 35-36 (1991) (describing people's aversion to ambiguity).

IN

36. See FRANCIS J. BROUCEK, SHAME AND THE SELF 41 (1991) (discussing the matura
tional process of seeing oneself as an object autonomous of others).
37.

See Massaro, supra note 17, at

83.

This argument is that
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[h]omosexuality threatens the current social organization not only as it is defined b sexually
created relationships, but also as it is theologically constructed and, perhaps to a lesser ex
tent, as it is politically organized. Sexual deviance . . . poses a triple threat . . . . The homo
sexual is not merely a gender outlaw, but also a religious heretic and a political seditionist.
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agitates many of us, to some degree. Coloring outside all of them agi
tates most of us, not just the unbalanced homophobe who kills in re
sponse to this agitation. Moreover, this agitation is not easily charac
terized as irrational in a clinical sense, though reliance on it by
government might be irrational in a liberal, legal sense.
Defining this liberal, legal meaning of "irrational" is extremely im
portant in fashioning constitutional arguments for gay equality, given
the Supreme Court's judicial unwillingness to apply elevated judicial
scrutiny to classifications other than ones that already have been re
ceiving such scrutiny. This foreclosure of any new "strict" or "inter
mediate" scrutiny routes for overturning discriminatory measures ef
fectively forces litigants down the "rational basis" path of review,
which will, I predict, excite considerable scholarly, judicial, and law
yerly interest in defining legislative "irrationality." Eskridge's psy
chological approach to irrationality is not helpful to this legal inquiry,
because it is both too narrow and too broad.
In any event, there is considerable irony (though also undeniable
symmetry) in psychologizing antigay animus and the people who act
on it. Same-sex erotic desires only recently shook off their own psy
chopathological fetters.38 Freeing same-sex desires and experiences
from their legal shackles, and from the residual social stigma and
shame, is not obviously furthered by reverse psychological labeling of
those people who are discomfited by, or even angrily resistant to, sex
ual variation.39
v.

Gaylaw's many virtues and its occasional weaknesses may point
the way toward a workable, even winnable, technique for challenging
38. The shift occurred in 1973, when the American Psychiatric Association formally de
clared that homosexuality "does not constitute a psychiatric disorder" and "implies no im
pairment in judgment, stability, reliability, or general social or vocational capabilities." See
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS (DSM-II) § 302.0, at 44 (6th prtg. 1974); Resolution of the American Psychiatric
Association, Dec. 15, 1973, reprinted in 131 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 497 (1974).
39. Pathologizing antigay animus also fits awkwardly into the book's overarching gener
osity toward communities that oppose homosexuality. Eskridge is remarkably charitable
throughout the book, even when describing regulations that criminalize consensual same-sex
intimacy, that terminate distinguished and honorable careers in the military and public sec
tor, and that otherwise inflict countless psychological, physical, and economic harms on gay
people. He betrays great respect for Georgetown's Jesuit traditions, despite their harsh ap
plication to its gay and lesbian students. In some other passages, he betrays less patience
with antigay impulses and derides· opponents of gay rights. For example, he comments,
amidst his otherwise formal litany of the historical legal suppression of gay people, that ho
mosexuals have been viewed as "dangerous 'pod people' out of the popular movie The Inva
sion of the Body Snatchers," p. 60, and that "antihomosexual terror in America . . . . rested
upon . . . wacky ideas," pp. 82-83. But these are gentle, droll gibes - gibes that hardly com
pare to the stern condemnation in the passages that deploy a psycho-topology of antigay
animus.
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antigay measures. Gay equality appeals in this next legal era should
hammer home the impressive historical and contemporary evidence of
the ineffectiveness of legal regulation of sexuality. Romer likely is the
best doctrinal cover for these legal appeals, because the Romer
framework is so spare, and thus may avoid theory snarls that might
discourage judicial intervention. Most of the antigay regulations that
Eskridge opposes could be toppled by a Romer-based, pragmatic as
sault; more important to this Review, however, is that none would fall
any faster, or more obviously, by another. Advocates of gay equality
should avoid the thicket of ornate political theorizing and the poten
tial boomerangs of postliberal legal theories. Instead, they should
rivet the judicial gaze on the practical, human consequences of each
antigay policy - what it really is, what it really does, whom it really
hurts, and what it really costs. The analysis should proceed policy by
policy, factual frame by factual frame.
An illustration of this technique can be found in the most recent
work of Janet Halley, which analyzes the military's "Don't Ask, Don't
Tell" policy.40 Halley opens by noting the pervasive assumption that
the 1993 policy is more lenient toward gay men and lesbians in uni
form than the policy it replaced. She follows immediately with her
underscored, unequivocal, and simple thesis: "The new military policy
is much, much worse than its predecessor."41 The balance of the book
is a penetrating, factually detailed, and thorough justification of this
grim characterization of the 1993 amendments.
Halley does several things that are of particular note here. She
holds one object of critique - the military policy - constant through
out. In doing so, she also exercises excruciating care to avoid either
the absurd sundering of homosexual self-identification and same-sex
erotic conduct that the status/conduct distinction entails, or the
equally troublesome tendency to conflate them.42 She zeroes in on the
ironic tautology embedded in the military policy - one that surfaces
in so many attempts to regulate (or to even describe) homosexuality:
"[W]hen the military predicts that self-described homosexuals will
commit homosexual sodomy unacceptably often, it invokes a category
of persons that has been developed precisely to make sense of its cate
gory ofacts."43 Indeed, the ironic, rhetorical renvoi that Halley identi
fies may be inescapable. Not only the military policymaker, but also
the serviceperson who says, "I am gay," implicitly may invoke that
same "category of persons that has been developed precisely to make

40. JANET E. HALLEY, DON'T: A READER'S GUIDE TO THE MlLITARY'S ANTI-GAY
POLICY (1999).
41. Id. at 1.
42 See id. at 63.
43. Id. at 65 (emphasis added).

1588

Michigan Law Review

(Vol. 98:1564

sense of its category of acts." This is because all statements of gay sol
dier identity must be understood against the backdrop of the military's
(and other regulatory forces') problematic, labile, customarily nega
tive, psycho-sociolegal assumptions about what "gay" is. Halley
grasps the pervasive significance of this irony and takes particular care
not to compound it.
Halley's attack on the military antigay policy - a policy that now
stands virtually alone in the Western world - is distinctive in two
other respects. It systematically unpacks the military policy to strip
away its veneer of sense, and it does so with minimal doctrinal or other
theoretical props. Only at the very end does Halley suggest a specific
legal plank for her attack - the rational basis test of constitutional
law. But she quickly exits this doctrinal discussion and lets the fact
based arguments do the persuasive work. She thereby elides the most
constricting double binds of doctrine, while deploying conventional,
quintessentially lawyerlike skill in exposing the infirm analytical struts
of the military policy.
She also pays scrupulous attention to language - not only the
military's, but also her own. She eschews open-ended statements like
"gay is good" or, for that matter, "heterosexuality is good." Rather,
she avoids reinstating any "gay" category in to the legal lexicon. This
is prudent, because deploying the term does not materially advance
arguments for restricting the government's role in regulating sexual
variations, and it may well boomerang. For "gay experience" to drop
away as a punishable behavior, "gay experience" should not be in
voked as a touchstone for any transformed jurisprudence. To charac
terize any law as "gaylaw" is to risk - however unintentionally perpetuating a flat, reductive, and unnuanced understanding of sexual
variations, which make it easier for lawmakers to justify attempts to
categorize and punish these variations.
Obviously, lawyers cannot escape doctrinal lines, categories, or re
ductive terminologies altogether. But there is a more or less to this
when it comes to legal advocacy. In contemporary constitutional
challenges of antigay regulations - the primary focus of Eskridge's
text - advocates should aim for less. That means minimal theorizing,
in favor of maximal factfinding, and extensive documentation of the
concrete, adverse, and unpredictable consequences of antigay meas
ures.
CONCLUSION

Gaylaw correctly identifies a central problem - law has con
structed "gay," engulfed "gay," and fostered a confusing, often harm
ful, unexpected profusion of possible readings and misreadings of the
people and behaviors it seeks to control. The way out of this snarl,
however, is not to re-enmesh "gay" within "law." Rather, advocates
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of gay equality should minimize theoretical adornments and avoid
terminology that obscures the complexities and range of human sexual
desires, identities, and conduct. Although the natural and under
standable impulse is to counter historically negative legal, psychologi
cal, and social treatment of gay experiences with a subversively posi
tive, updated meaning of "gaylaw," this urge should be resisted; for
the best way to free "gay" from law's constructing and constricting
grasp is not to fuse them anew, but to pry these terms apart.
Gaylaw offers excellent tools for effecting this separation. One
need only mine its rich historical passages and deft doctrinal argu
ments, pare away its theoretical excesses, and disaggregate its title.
The considerable residue is an elegant and well-documented prag
matic argument against most, if not all, of the remaining legal obsta
cles to gay equality. The argument may hasten the day when the un
becoming "gaylaw" chapter of American law is - at last - relegated
to American history.

